Historical re-enactment is an emerging social practice in the knowledge society, and it helps us better understand aspects of the past and heritage. The knowledge gained through historical recreation contributes to the construction of quality citizenship. The deepening of democratic values requires that educational systems commit to the promotion of critical citizenship. Service-learning constructively develops experiences that connect science, education and society. Our research describes a systematized praxis of historical recreation. It has been developed by university students, and it has (...) been carried out from the perspective of service-learning, in a manner consistent with the concepts of public history and public archaeology, to contribute to the promotion and defense of heritage history and the preservation of historical memory. (shrink)

La batalla del Ebro enfrento, durante 115 días personas y máquinas. Se experimentaron nuevas técnicas y tecnologías que jugarían un papel determinante en el inminente conflicto mundial. La aviación se utilizó, por primera vez, de manera masiva y su actuación fue decisiva. Sin embargo, su rastro patrimonial y es escaso. Al entorno de la guerra aérea en la Batalla del Ebro el presente trabajo plantea una experiencia de investigación transversal y holística que plantea la socialización didáctica del conocimiento histórico y (...) arqueológico a partir de propuestas metodológicas museográficas, de iconografía didáctica y de recuperación de la memoria histórica. El objetivo de esta acción combinada es generar y socializar conocimiento científico sobre el pasado y su legado material, incidir en la formación de una ciudadanía crítica y fomentar el desarrollo económico sostenible en base a la acción de industrias culturales relacionadas con el patrimonio. (shrink)

The paper argues that Lewis’ Genuine Modal Realism, in taking the plurality of worlds to be necessarily the way it is, implies the existence of necessary connections of the sort that contradicts the Humean thesis that Lewis endorses. By endorsing, pace Divers, a non-redundancy interpretation of advanced modalizing, we gain the means to exactly state what these connections amount to.

This guide accompanies the following articles: Sonia Roca‐Royes, ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2010.00363.x. Sonia Roca‐Royes, ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 65–77. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2010.00364.x. Author’s Introduction Intuitively, George Clooney could lose a finger and he would still be him. Also intuitively, he could not lose his humanity without ceasing to be altogether. So while he could have one less finger, he could not be other than human. These intuitions (...) suggest that there are two kinds of properties: on the one hand, there are essential properties and, on the other, there are accidental properties. Essentialism is the view that captures those intuitions and claims that some of an object’s properties are essential and some are accidental. Essential properties are often appealed to in metaphysical arguments. Consider the famous Goliath–Lumpl example. Goliath is a clay‐statue, and Lumpl is the piece of clay from which Goliath is made. Are Goliath and Lumpl the same entity, or are they distinct, despite coinciding in the same spatial region (at least for a period of time)? An argument in favour of their distinctness appeals to essential properties. Let s be Goliath’s shape. Lumpl’s current shape is therefore also s. It seems that Lumpl could lose its current shape and still exist. Yet, if Goliath – the statue – were melted, for instance, it would cease to exist. Behind this reasoning is the belief that having shape s is essential to Goliath but not to Lumpl. Goliath and Lumpl can therefore be distinguished by their essential properties. Consequently, and by Leibniz’s Indiscernibility of Identicals– according to which identicals cannot be distinguished – Goliath and Lumpl are distinct objects. The essentialist intuition appealed to in this argument is that shapes are essential to statues but not to pieces of clay. Of course, this particular argument – like any other – can be resisted. It is all the same a good illustration of how essentialism is put to work in metaphysics. A good understanding of the broad phenomenon of essentialism is therefore an unavoidable task, since the credit of a lot of metaphysical arguments partially depends on it. Although the topic has been studied for millenniums, the two papers that this guide accompanies are focused on contemporary issues in essentialism, and so will do this guide too. Author Recommends Fine, Kit. ‘Essence and Modality.’Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1–16. One of the most cited and influential papers against the modal account of the notion of essence and in favour of what has subsequently been referred to in the literature as ‘the Finean account of the notion of essence’. Forbes, Graeme. The Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. A foundational work in modality and essentialism. The first two chapters provide a valuable introduction to propositional and first order modal logic. Chapters 5–8 constitute a comprehensive essentialist theory and contain some of the most cited arguments for individual essences. Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1972/1980. Another foundational work. With this book – which is, among other things, a defence of a Direct Theory of Reference – Kripke rescues, after Quine’s powerful attacks against it, and using the semantic rigidity of proper names, (Aristotelian) essentialism. Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. An extremely valuable recent contribution to the field. Here, Mackie defends that, although essentialism is a real phenomenon, there are much fewer essential properties than is standardly believed, and labels this view ‘Minimalist Essentialism’. Beyond the intrinsic interest of the defence of Minimalist Essentialism, the book is also highly recommended for its clear reconstructions – and discussions – of some of the most influential essentialist arguments. In addition, the book’s bibliography is very comprehensive and updated, and it might be a useful resource for students. Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: OUP, 1974. Yet another foundational work. Here, Plantinga offers his essentialist theory which, like Forbes’, also incorporates individual essences although of a very different sort from Forbes’. Plantinga believes in purely non‐qualitative individual essences, whereas Forbes’ aims at purely qualitative ones. The book is also excellent to provide a solid background to those unfamiliar with the topic. Roca‐Royes. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass, 6/1 (2011): 54–64, doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2010.00363.x. This is one of the two papers this guide accompanies. It contains a comparative examination of two opposed responses to the problem of possibilia. One solution crucially appeals to individual essences and another – compatible with them, but not dependent on them – makes existence a necessary‐whenever‐possible property. Salmon, Nathan. Reference and Essence. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981. Against what Kripke’s Naming and Necessity might have induced us to believe, Salmon’s Reference and Essence argues that essentialism cannot be derived from the Direct Theory of Reference. Our commitments to essentialism should therefore come from somewhere else. It also contains one of the most cited and influential arguments against the transitivity of the accessibility relation between worlds, which relies on flexible essential properties. Online Materials The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy publishes extremely valuable entries on a vast variety of topics which are conveniently updated and revised. On essentialism, the following are to be highlighted: Teresa Robertson, ‘Essential vs. Accidental Properties’: Takashi Yagisawa, ‘Possible Objects’: Penelope Mackie, ‘Transworld Identity’: PhilPapers is an interactive directory of online philosophical publications to which one can subscribe, and which allows authors to submit their latest work. One might find it useful to check this on a regular basis, since contents are constantly updated. The following link is to the site’s resources on essentialism:. Sample Syllabus Because the phenomenon of essentialism is very broad, one can design an entire course on it, thereby having enough time to see some of the issues in considerable depth. The sample syllabus suggested here is of one such course, focusing exclusively on contemporary issues in essentialism. Less deeply, the topic of essentialism can also be introduced in a general course on metaphysics or on modality. To this effect, focusing on some of the topics suggested in weeks 1–6 below would perhaps be more appropriate than focusing on the more complex issues suggested for weeks 7–10. Week 1. Introduction to Essentialism. Two Notions of Essential Property: The Modal Account and the Finean Account Fine, Kit. ‘Essence and Modality.’Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1–16. Robertson, Teresa. ‘Essential vs. Accidental Properties.’Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy (Fall 2008 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL:. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.’Philosophy Compass, 6/1 (2011): 65–77. Sections 1–2. Week 2. Essentialist Principles, I: Three Arguments for the Essentiality of Origin Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1972/1980. Lecture III. Mackie, Penelope. ‘Identity, Time and Necessity.’Proceedings for the Aristotelian Society 98 (1998): 59–78. Rohbraugh, Guy and deRosset, Louis. ‘A New Route to the Necessity of Origin.’Mind 133 (2004): 705–25. Week 3. Essentialist Principles, II: Essentiality of Kind Brody, Baruch. ‘Natural Kinds and Real Essences.’Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967): 431–46. Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Chapters 7 and 8. Wiggins, David. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. Chapter 3. Week 4. Essentialist Principles, III: Natural Kind Essentialism Kripke, Saul. ‘Identity and Necessity.’Identity and Individuation, Ed. M. K. Munitz. New York: New York University Press, 1971. 135–64. Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1972/1980. Lecture III. Putnam, Hilary. ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”.’Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1975): 215–71. Week 5. Sufficient‐for‐Existence Properties (and Cross‐World Identification Principles) Chisholm, Roderick. ‘Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions.’Noûs 1.1 (1967): 1–8. Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Chapter 3. Salmon, Nathan. Reference and Essence. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981. Chapter 7. Week 6. Individual Essences Mackie, Penelope. ‘Transworld Identity.’The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL:. Section 4. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 65–77. Sections 3–4. Week 7. Flexible Essential Properties and S4 Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. Section 3. Salmon, Nathan. Reference and Essence. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981. Appendix 1. Week 8. Individual Essences and Possibilia Peacocke, Christopher. ‘Principles for Possibilia.’Noûs 36.3 (2002): 486–508. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. Section 2. Week 9. Necessitism and Essentialism: A Third Notion of Essential Property Linsky, Bernard and Zalta, Edward. ‘In Defense of the Contingently Nonconcrete.’Philosophical Studies 84 (1996): 283–94. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. Section 5. Williamson, Timothy. ‘Bare Possibilia.’Erkenntnis 48 (1998): 257–73. Week 10. Essentialism and Modal Logic: The Barcan Formula Menzel, Christopher. ‘Actualism.’The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL:. Section 2. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. Section 4. Focus Questions • There is a debate as to whether essential properties– as well as individual essences and sufficient‐for‐existence properties– should be specified in purely qualitative terms or whether, by contrast, non‐purely qualitative – or even purely non‐qualitative – specifications are allowed. What are the main arguments against the availability of purely qualitative specifications? • Flexible essential properties seem to be more plausible than non‐flexible ones. Yet, together with sufficient‐for‐existence properties, they imply flexible individual essences. How plausible are these? Should we revise our intuitions supporting flexible essential properties? • What are, ultimately, the ontological differences between a necessitist approach to possibilia and an individual‐essences‐based approach? • According to necessitism, essential properties do not impose necessary conditions for an object’s existence. Can the necessitist, nonetheless, capture this role of essential properties by saying that, when it comes to possibly concrete entities, essential properties provide necessary conditions for an object’s concreteness? Can they, on a similar vein, also offer sufficient‐for‐concreteness properties as a surrogate for the (non‐necessitist’s) sufficient‐for‐existence properties? • Even after the enormous amount of literature that essentialism has generated, we are far from reaching a general agreement as to which properties are essential and which are accidental. Should this be a reason to reflect, critically, on the methodology that is being used in the arguments for or against essential properties? Is reliance on intuitions inescapable? (shrink)

In well-known papers ([A-K1], [A-K2], and [E]) J. Ax, S. Kochen, and J. Ershov prove a transfer theorem for henselian valued fields. Here we prove an analogue for henselian valued and ordered fields. The orders for which this result apply are the usual orders and also the higher level orders introduced by E. Becker in [B1] and [B2]. With certain restrictions, two henselian valued and ordered fields are elementarily equivalent if and only if their value groups (with a little bit (...) more structure) and their residually ordered residue fields (a henselian valued and ordered field induces in a natural way an order in its residue field) are elementarily equivalent. Similar results are proved for elementary embeddings and ∀-extensions (extensions where the structure is existentially closed). (shrink)

El texto da la vuelta al estudio habitual de las transiciones y evoluciones políticas en el África neoindependiente al cuestionar el patrón que se suele utilizar para evaluarlas, el modelo ideal de la democracia moderna. El texto contrasta las oscilaciones del optimismo experto respecto de los estados africanos con las reiteradas constataciones empíricas de la inadecuación del modelo de Estado legado por la colonización a la realidad y el potencial del tejido social africano. El autor propone que numerosas presuntas disfunciones (...) africanas deberían ser analizadas como experimentos necesarios para garantizar la gestión de la diversidad en la sociedad global, una capacidad que no acumula el viejo modelo de Estado-nación europeo y que quizás implique abandonar o matizar el principio del individuo como única fuente última de soberanía. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo trata sobre la construcción de significados e interpretación conjunta de la obra literaria por medios digitales. Para ello, se hace una revisión a la realidad digital de la literatura y sus procesos de recepción: la lectura digital no viene determinada tanto por la naturaleza del texto como por el comportamiento del lector digital. Internet ha facilitado la creación de espacios de afinidad en los que los usuarios pueden reunirse en torno a sus aficiones, intereses u objetivos. Se (...) generan, así, comunidades de lectores en los que debaten, analizan y elaboran fanworks que, en suma, conforman el fandom. Desde esta perspectiva, es la comunidad, como inteligencia colectiva, y no el autor, la que establece los límites de la interpretación textual: decide qué es o no canónico. Todo ello permite llegar a la conclusión de que estas prácticas letradas permiten a los usuarios realizar una lectura virtualmente digital caracterizada por la sincronización y socialización de los procesos de comprensión e interpretación textual. Lo realmente interesante es la construcción del fanon pues se genera una lectura multilineal, hipertextual, transmediática, reactiva, y, sobre todo, consensuada.: This article deals with the construction of meanings and joint interpretation of the literary work by digital means. Thereby, a review of the digital reality of literature and its reception processes are made. Digital reading is not determined as much by the nature of the text as by the behavior of the digital reader. The Internet has facilitated the creation of affinity spaces where users can gather around their hobbies, interests or objectives. Thus, communities of readers are generated to debate, analyze and elaborate fanworks that, in short, make up the fandom. From this perspective, it is the community, as collective intelligence, and not the author, that sets the limits of textual interpretation: they decide what is or is not canonical. All of this allows us to conclude that these literacy practices allow users to perform a virtually digital reading characterized by the synchronization and socialization of the processes of comprehension and textual interpretation. The most interesting issue is the construction of the fanon because it generates a multilinear reading, hypertextual, transmedia, reactive, and, above all, consensus reading. (shrink)

Cet article met en lumière les liens qui unissent, dans le Livres des passages de Walter Benjamin, les réflexions sur la photographie et les fragments consacrés à la philosophie de l’histoire. On y montre plus particulièrement – dans un renvoi constant à la pensée postmoderne et à la théorie des médias – les implications esthétiques, gnoséologiques et sociologiques. This article aims to investigate to investigate the textual relations that link, in the thought of Walter Benjamin, the reflections on photography and (...) the fragments dedicated to the philosophy of history. Particularly, we focus on their aesthetics, gnoseological and sociological implications. (shrink)

The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.

According to Essentialism, an object’s properties divide into those that are essential and those that are accidental. While being human is commonly thought to be essential to Socrates, being a philosopher plausibly is not. We can motivate the distinction by appealing—as we just did—to examples. However, it is not obvious how best to characterize the notion of essential property, nor is it easy to give conclusive arguments for the essentiality of a given property. In this paper, I elaborate on these (...) issues and explore the way in which essential properties behave in relation to other related properties, like sufficient-for-existence properties and individual essences. (shrink)

The paper compares the suitability of two different epistemologies of counterfactuals—(EC) and (W)—to elucidate modal knowledge. I argue that, while both of them explain the data on our knowledge of counterfactuals, only (W)—Williamson’s epistemology—is compatible with all counterpossibles being true. This is something on which Williamson’s counterfactual-based account of modal knowledge relies. A first problem is, therefore, that, in the absence of further, disambiguating data, Williamson’s choice of (W) is objectionably biased. A second, deeper problem is that (W) cannot satisfactorily (...) elucidate modal knowledge. Third, from a naturalistic perspective, the nature of this second problem favours (EC) against (W). (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza el hilo conductor que va de Pierre Hadot a François Jullien pasando por Michel Foucault, y que se sostiene en el papel de la filosofía como transformador de sí para alcanzar una vida verdadera. Hadot y Foucault buscan referentes en las escuelas antiguas grecorromanas, mientras que François Jullien lo hace en la sabiduría tradicional china. Pero en todos los casos es una búsqueda del pasado para volver al presente y así actualizar este diálogo con los antiguos. Pierre (...) Hadot hablará de la filosofía como ejercicio espiritual; Michel Foucault, como del cuidado de sí, y François Jullien, como del aprendizaje del vivir existiendo. La continuidad está en esta voluntad de hacer de la filosofía un instrumento para construirse como sujeto ético, cuyo resultado es otro modo de vida, una vida verdadera. (shrink)

The paper argues against Peacocke's moderate rationalism in modality. In the first part, I show, by identifying an argumentative gap in its epistemology, that Peacocke's account has not met the Integration Challenge. I then argue that we should modify the account's metaphysics of modal concepts in order to avoid implausible consequences with regards to their possession conditions. This modification generates no extra explanatory gap. Yet, once the minimal modification that avoids those implausible consequences is made, the resulting account cannot support (...) Peacocke's moderate rationalism. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the Epistemic Challenge for mind-independent accounts of modality. The challenge can be formulated as an inconsistency problem among three premises and, therefore, any strategy to meet the challenge will require the negation of (at least) one of its premises. The aim of the paper is not to offer a positive solution to the challenge, but rather to argue for the claim that to follow a hybrid strategy is probably the best way to meet it. With some (...) qualifications, reasons are given as to why empiricism should be the way to meet the challenge as far as de re modality is concerned, whereas rationalism might be the correct way of addressing it for the case of de dicto modality. (shrink)

A partir del diagnóstico de que la globalización socio-económica y la mundialización cultural están cambiando la forma de vivenciar el mundo, el autor señala que la espiritualidad representa la posibilidad de dar más de sí, y explora desde allí el ecosistema humano, preguntándose si éste puede dar más de sí. Afirma que la espiritualidad requerida por la situación actual se despliega en el ejercicio de la ciudadanía activa.

El autor abre una amplia y profunda interrogante sobre la esperanza, recordándonos que en torno a la guerra se elevan las manifestaciones a favor de la paz; teniendo éstas su expresión principal en los foros anti-globalizadores y en los consejos ecuménicos, actuando como una presión desde abajo, que moviliza las conciencias y obliga a la clase política a saldar las cuentas con la voluntad popular. Es la sociedad civil mundial tras nuevas metas de humanización y emancipación, y desarrollo de la (...) conciencia mundial de la interdependencia. Nos propone finalmente que rastrear la esperanza, con sus distintos ropajes, en el interior del conflicto bélico significa reconocer que la historia no está sellada. (shrink)

This paper scrutinises the limits of a posteriori induction in acquiring modal knowledge. I focus on my similarity-based account (Roca-Royes [2017]); an inductive, non-rationalist epistemology of modality about concrete entities. Despite the explanatory merits of the account in relation to a vast range of modal claims, this inductive epistemology has been found incapable of yielding knowledge of a certain, other range of modal claims. Here, two notions of knowability are distinguished which reveal some of these limitations to be not (...) only accidental to the method but also virtuous. Additionally, the scrutiny suggests a recipe for increasingly pushing back, as modal enquirers, some of these limits. Limits will irremediably remain. But, as modal epistemologists, it is to explain what lies beyond these irremediable limits (not within) that we should look somewhere else. (shrink)

This article echoes those voices that demand new approaches and ‹senses’ for management education and business programs. Much of the article is focused on showing that the polemic about the educative model of business schools has moral and epistemological foundations and opens up the debate over the type of knowledge that practitioners need to possess in order to manage organizations, and how this knowledge can be taught in management programs. The article attempts to highlight the moral dimension of management through (...) a reinterpretation of the Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom. I defend the ideas that management is never morally neutral and that Aristotelian practical wisdom allows the recovery of moral considerations in management practice. I analyze the impact and implications that the introduction of practical wisdom in business schools entails for the conception and objectives of management education. This view reconfigures management education in terms of attention to values, virtues and context. Therefore, management programmes should prepare students to critically evaluate what they hear and to make decisions coherent with their values and virtues. In the final section, I reflect on the pedagogical implications of this approach. I point out that an integrated model of ethics and practical wisdom promotes education of cognition and education of affect as well. I provide an example to illustrate my perspective and to support my conclusions. (shrink)

Pace Necessitism – roughly, the view that existence is not contingent – essential properties provide necessary conditions for the existence of objects. Sufficiency properties, by contrast, provide sufficient conditions, and individual essences provide necessary and sufficient conditions. This paper explains how these kinds of properties can be used to illuminate the ontological status of merely possible objects and to construct a respectable possibilist ontology. The paper also reviews two points of interaction between essentialism and modal logic. First, we will briefly (...) see the challenge that arises against S4 from flexible essential properties; as well as the moves available to block it. After this, the emphasis is put on the Barcan Formula (BF), and on why it is problematic for essentialists. As we will see, Necessitism can accommodate both (BF) and essential properties. What necessitists cannot do at the same time is to continue to understanding essential properties as providing necessary conditions for the existence of individuals; against what might be for some a truism. (shrink)

In this article I examine the differences between broadcast political interviews in commercial and public service broadcasters in Spain. The study focuses in particular on political interviews broadcast on ‘morning show’ type programmes. The analysis distinguishes the characteristics that make up the news interview turn-taking system in order to explore the degree to which information and entertainment come together in political interviews broadcast on morning shows. The results show, primarily, that political interviews shown on public service broadcasters’ morning shows adhere (...) to the journalistic standards of neutralism and adversarialness. This is precisely how they strive to make the politician publicly accountable. In political interviews broadcast by commercial broadcasters, however, these rules are followed intermittently. The aim of these interviews appears to be different: to penetrate politicians’ personal sphere with the discernible purpose of entertaining. These differences reflect different interview styles which, in turn, reveal different conceptions of journalism, politics and society. This investigation utilizes the research tools developed in conversation analysis. (shrink)

In ‘A New Route to the Necessity of Origin’, Rohbraugh and deRosset offer an argument for the Necessity of Origin appealing neither to Suffciency of Origin nor to a branching-times model of necessity. What is doing the crucial work in their argument is instead the thesis they name ‘Locality of Prevention’. In this response, we object that their argument is question-begging by showing, first, that the locality of prevention thesis is not strong enough to satisfactorily derive from it the intended (...) conclusion, and, second, that the argument is not sound unless the Necessity of Origin is operating as an implicit premiss. (shrink)

Nowadays, batteries play an important role in a lot of different applications like energy storage, electro-mobility, consumer electronic and so on. All the battery types have a common factor that is their complexity, independently of its nature. Usually, the batteries have an electrochemical nature. Several different test are accomplished to check the batteries performance, and commonly, it is predictable how they work depending of their technology. The present research describes the hybrid intelligent system created to accomplish fault detection over a (...) Lithium Iron Phosphate—LiFePO4 power cell type, commonly used in electro-mobility applications. The approach is based on the cell temperatures behaviour for voltage and current specific values. Taken into account the operating range of a real system based on a LiFePO4 cell, a large set of points of operation have been used to achieve the dataset. The different behaviour zones have been obtained by clustering as a first step. Then, different regression techniques have been used over each cluster. Polynomial regression, artificial neural networks and support vector regression were the combined techniques to develop the hybrid intelligent model proposed. The intelligent system gives very good results over the operating range, detecting all the faults tested during the validation. (shrink)

Due to the influence of Nathan Salmon’s views, endorsement of the “flexibility of origins” thesis is often thought to carry a commitment to the denial of S4. This paper rejects the existence of this commitment and examines how Peacocke’s theory of the modal may accommodate flexibility of origins without denying S4. One of the essential features of Peacocke’s account is the identification of the Principles of Possibility, which include the Modal Extension Principle (MEP), and a set of Constitutive Principles. Regarding (...) their modal status, Peacocke argues for the necessity of MEP, but leaves open the possibility that some of the Constitutive Principles be only contingently true. Here, I show that the contingency of the Constitutive Principles is inconsistent with the recursivity of MEP, and this makes the account validate S4. It is also shown that, compatibly with the necessity of the Constitutive Principles, the account can still accommodate intuitions about flexibility of origins. However, the account we end up with once those intuitions are consistently accommodated may not be satisfactory, and this opens up the debate about whether or not artefacts allow for some variation in their origins. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est double. Il défend d’abord, contre une menace potentielle, la thèse selon laquelle une capacité pour la connaissance essentialiste ne doit pas figurer parmi les capacités fondamentales pour la connaissance des contrefactuels. Il évalue ensuite une conséquence de cette thèse, ou du moins de la défense que j’en fais qui s’appuie sur une discussion des théories de Kment et de Williamson portant sur le lien entre la modalité et les contrefactuels.

La Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos de 1948 nació y tendió a la expansión del reconocimiento universal de la dignidad humana. Incorporando el pasado, tratando de comprender el sentido de la existencia e incluyendo al mundo en esa búsqueda, aspiró a lo categórico, a conocer la esencia, el valor intrínseco del ser humano, en relación con otros seres. Hoy, en su nombre, dada la actual ruptura con la tradición y la Historia, se ha extendido una nueva y paradójica concepción (...) de lo humano, emancipadora y homogeneizante. Clamando la reivindicación del “yo”, se ha producido una inconsistencia absoluta en la aplicación de la DUDH: no puede seguir llamándose universal una Carta subsumida y aplicada en un contexto radicalmente uniforme. (shrink)

This paper is an exploration of the prospects of rationalist, concept-based epistemologies of modality as far as essentialist and de re modal claims are concerned. I grant certain explanatory power to such epistemologies but, primarily, I identify their limitations. I first explore them in view of the (possible) existence of general as well as of singular modally loaded concepts and find their explanatory scope severely limited. Inspired by the abstractionist's concept-and-entitlement based hybrid model, the paper then explores a similarly hybrid (...) strategy. The outcome of this exploration is that, regardless of its explanatory scope, it would be a misnomer to describe such hybrid view as concept-based. The result generalizes. (shrink)

We characterize omissibility of a type, or a family of types, in a countable theory in terms of non-existence of a certain tree of formulas. We extend results of L. Newelski on omitting $ non-isolated types. As a consequence we prove that omissibility of a family of $ types is equivalent to omissibility of each countable subfamily.

We study the degree of elimination of imaginaries needed for the three main applications: to have canonical bases for types over models, to define strong types as types over algebraically closed sets and to have a Galois correspondence between definably closed sets B such that A ⊆ B ⊆ acl and closed subgroups of the Galois group Aut/A). We also characterize when the topology of the Galois group is the quotient topology.

Sr. Rector de la Universidad BolivarianaIlustrísimas autoridadesProfesores de la UniversidadMiembros de la Comunidad universitariaRepresentantes de las organizaciones solidariasSeñoras y señoresMe siento profundamente feliz y conmovido. Feliz por haberme abierto las puertas de esta universidad y concederme esta alta distinción que no sólo culmina una amistad sino que inicia un camino de estrecha colaboración y de esperanzas entretejidas. Me honráis compañeros con vuestra acogida a este claust..

Hablar de poesía y hablar de poesía escrita por mujeres es fundamentalmente abrirse a lo diferente desde una mirada interadora.